We cannot test animals for insight's distinctive phenomenology, the "aha" experience, but we can study the processes underlying insightful behaviour, classically described by Köhler as sudden solution of a problem after an impasse. The central question in the study of insightful behaviour in any species is whether it is the product of a distinctive cognitive process, insight. Although some claims for insight in animals confuse it with other problem-solving processes, contemporary research on string pulling and other physical problems, primarily with birds, has uncovered new examples of insightful behaviour and shed light on the role of experience in producing it. New research suggests insightful behaviour can be captured in common laboratory tasks while brain activity is monitored, opening the way to better integration of research on animals with the cognitive neuroscience of human insight.
A chimpanzee gestures fruitlessly toward a banana lying beyond arm's reach. An elephant extends its trunk toward an apple hanging high overhead. When animals are confronted with inaccessible rewards like these, do they ever use insight to solve the problem of getting them? That is, do they seem to suddenly see a solution? This question was central to some of the earliest studies of animal problem solving (Boakes, 1984) . It also motivated the seminal work of Köhler (1925 Köhler ( /1959 and figured in Thorpe's (1956) discussion of learning in animals, but otherwise the question whether nonhuman species have insight was largely neglected by comparative psychologists for most of the 20th century. One exception was D. O. Hebb (1949) , in whose honour this essay is written and whose contributions are discussed later in this article.
Recently the study of animal insight has reemerged as part of the burgeoning field of comparative cognition. Contemporary research on many topics in this field such as memory, numerical and spatial cognition, and theory of mind has become seamlessly integrated with theory and data from cognitive neuroscience and human cognitive and developmental psychology (see Shettleworth, 2010a) . A good example is in the study of numerical cognition. Parallel experiments with monkeys and children have uncovered common systems for precise assessment of small numbers of items and for approximate representations of large quantities (Cantlon, Platt, & Brannon, 2009 ). These same systems are evident in behavioural tests with human adults and in single-cell recordings with monkeys (Nieder & Dehaene, 2009) , supporting a view of human numerical competence in which it develops via uniquely human mechanisms from simple core systems shared with other species (Spelke & Lee, 2012) . In contrast, with few exceptions (e.g., Call, in press), most current discussions of animal insight almost completely overlook recent literature on human problem-solving. They also tend to give short shrift to explanations of insightful behaviours in terms of basic learning mechanisms. The purpose of this article is to redress this balance and to ask whether doing so suggests new directions for comparative research.
The article has three main sections. For a basis from which to compare work with nonhuman animals (henceforth simply animals), we first look at major issues and approaches in current research on human insight. We then turn to the landmarks in 20th century research on animal insight, with particular attention to the work of Köhler (1925 Köhler ( /1959 and Epstein (1985) . Finally we look at a sample of 21st century studies with diverse species and paradigms that have been claimed to reveal insight.
Human Insight: A Brief Review
Like the problem of the out-of-reach banana or the dangling apple, problems that humans may solve insightfully involve a goal that cannot be reached in the way most subjects try first. Such problems can be as simple as a paper-and-pencil test in which dots in a 3 ϫ 3 array must be joined by four connected straight lines (the "9 dot" problem, see Weisberg, 2006) . Just as stretching toward the banana will not work, drawing four lines around the edge of the square of nine dots or any arrangement of four lines entirely within the square will not work. People must literally "think outside the box" to solve the 9 dot problem. (For readers who need help, illustrations of the problem and its solution are readily found on the Internet.) From designing buildings to "getting" a joke to completing simple verbal puzzles like "find the word that can be combined with each of pine, crab, and sauce to make a compound word," insightful solutions have three general properties (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005;  Chapter 6 in Weisberg, 2006) . 1. They appear suddenly, accompanied by a distinctive subjective experience of surprise and delight, the "aha" moment (Bowden et al., 2005) .
2. They appear after an impasse, that is, a period of unsuccessful attempts, rather than by gradually homing in on the solution through an analytical approach (Weisberg, 2006) . With verbal or perceptual problems, "homing in" is mental trial and error, invisible to the observer, but subjects readily distinguish solutions arrived at in this way from sudden insights accompanied by "aha" moments (Bowden et al., 2005) .
3. They involve restructuring the problem, that is, approaching it in a new way.
These three descriptive or operational features set insightful solutions of novel problems apart from those obviously arrived at by trial and error: insightful problem solution is characterised by an abrupt transition from failure to success. Immediate solutions are not typically called insightful because a problem solved immediately is not really a problem for the subject.
All three key properties of insightful problem solving by humans have counterparts in animal problem solving. In the next section of this article we see examples of sudden appearance of behaviour apparently unrelated to immediately previous attempts at solution (properties 1 and 2) and of approaching a problem in a new way. For instance, the chimpanzee obtains the banana by picking up a stick and using it as a rake (Köhler, 1925 (Köhler, /1959 . The elephant reaches the apple by pushing a box into position underneath and standing on it (Foerder, Galloway, Barthel, Moore, & Reiss, 2011) . Behaviour having these properties will be referred to in this article as insightful. But even if it is possible to identify a distinct class of insightful behaviours, the question remains whether they reflect a distinct cognitive process, insight. In Gestalt psychology, insight-the restructuring responsible for insightful problem solution-was conceptualised as a perceptual process like seeing the alternative form of an ambiguous or reversing figure (Ludmer, Dudai, & Rubin, 2011) . It did not express an understanding of the physics of the situation nor did it depend on specific experience with elements of the problem. Indeed, the enemy of restructuring is "functional fixedness," persistent reliance on past experience or preconceptions (for a recent example, see Hanus, Mendes, Tennie, & Call, 2011) .
Contemporary research on human insight uses a variety of tasks including verbal puzzles, tests with paper and pencil such as the 9 dot problem, and actual physical problems (for reviews see Bowden et al., 2005; Sternberg & Davidson, 1995; Chapter 6 in Weisberg, 2006) . As in research with nonhuman species, the basic theoretical question is whether any established model of "normal" problem solving can account for insightful problem solution or whether a special mechanism is involved. Because insight is an aspect of creativity, the answer for human subjects has implications for education: if we understand insight, perhaps we can teach people to be more creative. However, researchers do not all agree how best to study insight (Weisberg, 2006) . For instance, classic difficult-to-solve problems such as the 9 dot problem are sometimes classified as "insight problems," but they do not necessarily always require insight to solve. Contemporary studies frequently incorporate brain imaging to test whether insightful solutions have characteristic neural signatures (Kounios & Beeman, 2009 ). However, because it is not clear whether the findings are general to the whole gamut of problems-perceptual, verbal, physical-that may be solved in an "aha" moment, the results cannot confidently be applied to other species. Finally, the ongoing debate between "business as usual" and "special process" theorists (Bowden et al., 2005) is complicated by the fact that there is more than one theoretical approach to human problem solving. Despite these problems, however, there seems to be agreement that wellestablished processes such as experience with the elements play a role in all problem solving whether insightful or not.
Given these considerations, it would be a mistake for students of animal behaviour to proceed as if insight, as a distinct cognitive process, is so well understood in humans that they need only do parallel experiments with their favourite species to demonstrate it. In any case, we cannot assess "aha" experiences and literal perceptual restructuring in nonverbal creatures. Therefore we must use the established strategy for seeking evidence in animals for processes that people evidence primarily by verbal report: look for functionally similar behaviour as evidence for a common underlying process. Research on episodic memory (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998) and metacognition (Hampton, 2009 ) are welldeveloped examples. Here behavioural and sometimes neurological investigations of common cognitive processes have proceeded while setting aside issues of phenomenology, that is, whether animals experience their episodic memories and metacognitions in the same way humans do.
Given that animals can show insightful behaviours, that is, abrupt solutions of novel cognitive problems, the first line of attack is usually to test whether processes other than insight can explain the behaviour in question. The usual suspect is associative learning (Heyes, 2012) . Associative learning is usually thought to be ruled out-and a process of insight thereby ruled in-by sudden appearance of a successful problem solution that the animal did not appear to practice beforehand. But, as we will see, this assumption rests on an impoverished view of associative learning and its effects. A behaviour not directly practiced in a given situation can nevertheless be the result of associative learning, perhaps together with species-typical behavioural predispositions. Evidence for such a view can be seen in the earliest work on animal insight, which is discussed next.
Animal Insight: A Brief History
Köhler Wolfgang Köhler (1925 /1959 ) is usually credited with introducing the concept of insight into comparative psychology (Boakes, 1984; Weisberg, 2006) . His work with apes was conceived in the context of Thorndike's (e.g., Thorndike, 1911 /1970 claims that animals solve problems gradually, first succeeding through random trial and error and slowly becoming more skillful. Thorndike's puzzle box experiments themselves were based pretty directly on "clever animal" anecdotes reported by Romanes (1892) and other late 19th century supporters of Darwin, who wished to show that animals learn to open gates and the like by reasoning as people would. In the view of Köhler and other Gestalt psychologists, Thorndike's animals could do no better than escape from his boxes by chance at first because their structure did not permit other kinds of solutions. For instance, in a puzzle box where pushing a post in the middle of the floor opens a door in the wall, there is no perceptible relationship between the post and the door. When he found himself on the island of Tenerife with a group of seven chimpanzees, Köhler set out to observe what animals do with problems more conducive to insightful or intelligent solutions. The problems, several already used by the early British psychologist Hobhouse (see Boakes, 1984) , have become classics: using a stick or standing on a box to reach inaccessible food, pulling the one of two or more strings that is attached to food.
Köhler clearly observed some cases of insightful behaviour. For example, when first encountering bananas hanging out of reach but with a box about 2.5 m away, the animals all tried to obtain the food by leaping at it. "Sultan soon relinquished this attempt, paced restlessly up and down, suddenly stood still in front of the box, seized it . . ." (p. 38, Köhler, 1925 Köhler, /1959 and moved it to a position from which he jumped and tore down the bananas. Köhler's observations of the chimpanzees using sticks to reach food reinforced the Gestalt belief in insight as perceptual restructuring. During early tests sticks were used only when they were lying in the same field of view as the food, as if the animal had to see how the stick filled the gap between hand and food. Only with experience did animals readily fetch sticks from elsewhere.
Errors were just as revealing, and more frequent, than insightful solutions to problems. Many of the problems were not solved by all the animals, although as their past histories and exact ages were not all known, the reasons for the differences among them can only be guessed at. Köhler distinguished between "good" and "bad" errors. The former were behaviours somehow appropriate to the task whereas the latter seemed to be the sort of random responses emphasised by Thorndike. In addition were "stupid" errors, habits acquired when a task had been repeated many times. For example, a box might be placed where bananas usually hung after they had been moved. But Köhler did not wish to deny the beneficial effects of experience, only that Thorndikean trial and error was not the only process involved in initial successes. Among other things, he recognised the importance of generalisation. Trying to pull in a bait with a plant stalk or even a shoe in the absence of sticks was not stupid but evidence of treating objects with similar "outline and consistency" (ibid. p. 35) as sticks.
A handful of American researchers with opportunities to study young chimpanzees in captivity subsequently followed up Köhler's observations, mainly with the goal of documenting the role of species-typical predispositions and prior experience in tool use. Herbert Birch (1945) tested six young lab-reared chimpanzees with a hoe-like tool and out of reach food. Initially two solved the problem; the one that had played with sticks did so right away and the other after accidentally causing the stick to move the food. Then all the animals were given sticks to play with in their home cages for three days, during which they gradually began to use sticks as extensions of their arms. All then used the hoe successfully right away, a performance that Birch suggested would be seen as insightful by anyone not familiar with the role of past experience in producing it. In his view, the animal first confronted with a stick and inaccessible food does not perceive a Gestalt, but recognizes a functional relation between its arm, the stick, and the food, and this recognition depends on learning together with "basic species characteristics." Importantly, experience does not result only in stereotyped behaviours.
The ethologist Paul Schiller (1957) found that young chimpanzees spontaneously played with boxes, sticks, and cloth using basic manipulative behaviours such as grasping, carrying, and shaking, which became more elaborate with experience. Animals might join sticks together or pile boxes and climb on them in play. However, because they did not always use the same behaviours to obtain food, Schiller (1952) concluded that insightful problem solution was attributable to the chance appropriate occurrence of such behaviours. Unlike Birch, he (Schiller, 1952) found that chimpanzees did not automatically use sticks to rake in food after they had played with sticks but needed fairly specific experiences such as shaping with an oblique stick positioned close to the food. Like Köhler, he found that fetching a stick from elsewhere appeared only after skill in using a stick placed near the food. Young animals took an especially long time, whereas adolescents and adults, more similar in age to the animals tested by Köhler, progressed even to sequential tool use (using a short stick to obtain another stick long enough to reach food) relatively quickly. Like Birch, Schiller concluded that problem solving is the reorganization of past experience, not the rigid repetition of past actions. As we see presently, the approach developed by Robert Epstein captures this idea and makes more precise what "reorganization" might consist of.
Hebb
Although he is not usually mentioned in histories of insight, Hebb devoted a chapter of his 1949 book, The Organization of Behaviour, to it. Research indicating that experience with the elements of a task played a role in insightful solutions was very compatible with Hebb's views, in which complex cognitions and behaviours are built from simpler ones. The following comment from that chapter bears quoting:
he animal put into a new situation will perceive its parts as familiar and as related in a meaningful way. . . . The behavior is then insightful, as an organized set of responses to a new total situation. . . . a new temporal combination of elements which themselves were organized by experience obviously depends on learning but is not learned." (Hebb, 1949, p. 165) .
Evidence that insightful solutions are more common in older than younger animals was also consistent with Hebb's views: older animals have the requisite past experiences which can be recombined to solve new problems. We see recent evidence for the effect of age later in this article. In emphasising the role of related experience Hebb was in tune with recent research in which subjects' experiences are manipulated before exposing them to novel problems.
Thorpe
Primarily known as the father of modern research on bird song learning, W. H. Thorpe contributed to contemporary discussions of animal insight through a frequently quoted definition in his classic textbook, Learning and Instinct in Animals (Thorpe, 1956 ). Thorpe distinguished between insight as "the apprehension of relations" and insight learning. The latter was defined as "the sudden production of a new adaptive response not arrived at by trial behaviour or the solution of a problem by the sudden adaptive reorganization of experience" (Thorpe, 1956, p. 100; italics in original) . The first part of the italicized definition corresponds roughly to what is called here insightful behaviour, but the second seems more an interpretation of underlying mechanism. Thorpe's view of insight went beyond its possible role in production of insightful behaviour to suggestions that it was involved in imitation and in apprehending the causal or temporal relationships necessary for associative learning.
Along with Köhler's observations, the definition quoted here is often cited in contemporary publications as the definition of insight for animals. But whether or not a response is "arrived at by trial behaviour" (i.e., trial and error) may be a matter of judgment. As discussed in the next section, behaviour that looks quite different from anything the animal has learned before may in fact reflect subtle forms of generalisation from past experience. By imaginatively comparing groups of animals with differing experiences, behaviour that at first appears to reflect insight may be shown not to.
Epstein
Thanks to findings such as those of Birch and Schiller together with the tremendous growth in the study of instrumental and classical conditioning, discussion of insight as a special problem solving mechanism largely disappeared from textbooks about learning in animals for the next 50 years. Unsurprisingly then, one of the few new empirical contributions to the area during this period used conditioning theory to explain how pigeons insightfully solve the "banana and box" problem (Epstein, Kirshnit, Lanza, & Rubin, 1984) . This tongue-in-cheek article in Nature described what pigeons did when placed in a small circular enclosure with a toy banana hanging out of reach and a small box tall enough to allow them to reach the banana. All the birds had previously been rewarded with food for pecking the banana, but only three birds succeeded in pushing the box under the banana and climbing onto it to reach their goal. Two had been trained to climb on the box and peck the banana when the box was already in place and extinguished (not reinforced) for jumping and flying toward the banana when the box was absent. In addition, in interleaved sessions with the banana absent they had been trained to push the box toward a spot at a random location on the wall. When these pigeons were confronted with the banana out of reach, the box present but displaced from under it, and no spot was on the wall, they looked back and forth between banana and box at first, appearing "confused" to human observers. Then, within less than two minutes, they abruptly began to push the box in the direction of the banana, stopped when it was underneath, climbed and pecked. Control birds trained to peck but not to climb or push or trained to climb and peck but only to push aimlessly did not succeed. Evidently, then, both directed pushing and climbing to peck must be part of the birds' repertoire. But in the past pushing has been directed toward the green spot, so how exactly do the learned behaviours interact to produce a successful outcome?
Here this work, frivolous though it may first appear, makes its most important contribution. In the "insight" paper and elsewhere, Epstein (e.g., 1985 ) detailed the specific well-known and independently documented behavioural principles that account for the appearance of novel solutions to the banana and box problem and by implication for insightful behaviour more generally. The essence of this claim is that behaviour in novel situations can be entirely explained by responses to present cues together with past history (including evolutionary history in the sense of species-typical behaviours). No special cognitive process such as insight is required to account for the abrupt appearance of correct solutions of novel problems. As described by Epstein (1985) with some additional support from recent research, these processes include the following.
Multiple controlling stimuli. This is basic ethology. Any situation has various cues of significance to an animal. Often these control different and incompatible behaviours. What the animal does at any time depends on the relative strengths of these different behavioural tendencies, which may change in a dynamic way as described below. Thus, when the pigeons first confronted the out of reach banana and the displaced box, two previously learned behaviours were elicited. The fact that neither could be fully completed because the spot was absent and the banana could not be reached and pecked from the box resulted in the pigeon looking back and forth.
Changing dynamics. A given behaviour may change the situation so that a different behaviour becomes more probable. Here, because the pigeons had been explicitly extinguished for flying and jumping at the banana when it was out of reach, looking toward the banana diminished fairly rapidly, leaving approach to the box to predominate. Indeed the one bird that had been trained like the immediately successful birds except it was not extinguished for jumping and flying at the banana spent the first four minutes of the test jumping and flying before approaching the box. Having approached the box, the birds engaged in the previously reinforced behaviour of pushing, but why did they push toward the banana? This is accounted for by the next principle.
Functional generalisation. Also called mediated generalisation (Urcuioli, 2006) , this refers to the fact that two or more events associated with the same response, stimulus, or outcome come to be treated as to some extent equivalent. Functional or mediated generalisation thus contrasts with the ubiquitous phenomenon of stimulus generalisation (Ghirlanda & Enquist, 2003) , in which cues are responded to in the same way to the extent they are perceptually similar. As shown by a substantial body of data and theory (Delius, Jitsumori, & Siemann, 2000; Urcuioli, 2006) , functional or mediated generalisation is in effect a mechanism for classifying together things that are perceptually dissimilar. Here the banana became the target of pushing when the spot was absent because both had been associated with food.
Automatic chaining. Another aspect of changing dynamics, automatic chaining refers to the fact that a predictable sequence of behaviours emerges when one behaviour more or less by chance changes a situation so that a second behaviour becomes more likely. By pushing the box toward the banana, the "insightful" pigeons produced the situation (box under banana) in which climbing had been much more strongly reinforced than any other behaviour. This explanation is supported by observations on a control bird that had been trained to climb and peck but to push the box only in random directions. This bird happened to move the box under the banana after 14 minutes, and seeing the banana overhead it climbed and pecked. Importantly, automatic chaining is a mechanism by which apparently purposeful sequences of behaviour arise without planning.
Resurgence. Also an aspect of changing dynamics, resurgence refers to the fact that when two responses have been trained in a given situation, first one then the other, the first response reappears when the second is extinguished. More generally, old behaviour reappears when more recently trained behaviour is no longer effective. Resurgence is now well documented in studies of rats (Reed & Morgan, 2007) and pigeons (Lieving & Lattal, 2003) trained on more conventional operant responses.
Interconnection is Epstein's (1985) term for the entire complex and dynamic process by which "old behaviours blend or become interconnected in new ways," the process he claims underlies human as well as animal creativity. Interconnection has been demonstrated in several other studies similar to the "banana and box" experiment. In the one most closely related (Epstein, 1987) , four behaviours were interconnected by training a pigeon to peck a banana, climb on a box, push the box toward a spot, and open a door. When the box was now behind the door and the banana out of reach, the bird opened the door, obtained the box, pushed it under the banana, climbed, and pecked. In what can be seen as a demonstration of tool use (Epstein & Medalie, 1983) , a pigeon learned to peck a panel that was slowly moved out of reach behind an opening at the bottom of a wall. The bird was then provided with a small flat box, which it pushed through the opening to operate the panel. Although no control birds were included in this study, this novel performance was presumably possible because the bird had been trained independently in directed pushing of the box. In a similar setup, Nakajima and Sato (1993) trained pigeons to peck a key behind an opening in a wall. When a white block was placed in front of the opening, only birds that had learned independently to push a block removed it and pecked the key. Success came more quickly if block-push training had involved a white rather than a black block, demonstrating a role for stimulus generalisation in interconnection. Epstein (e.g., 1985) applied the same approach to human problem solving, using mathematical model of interconnection to depict progress in solving the classic "two string" test of insight. Here a person must connect two dangling strings that hang too far apart to be reached simultaneously. The solution is to tie an apparently unrelated object to one of the strings and set it swinging so it can be grabbed while holding onto the other string. Just as with the pigeons and the banana, people first must extinguish the obvious initial response of reaching from one string to another, and the characteristics of the object provided as well as previous relevant training or reminders (e.g., about pendulums) influence the speed of solution. That is to say, in all species interconnection by means of resurgence, automatic chaining, functional or stimulus generalisation, and so on is influenced in predictable ways by past history and the arrangement of present cues. As we see in the next section, this framework generates testable alternatives to recent claims that animals' novel behaviours in using or making tools or solving other problems reflect insight or another specialized process.
Animal Insight: Contemporary Research

String Pulling
Confronted with food tied to a string, will an animal pull on the string and haul in the otherwise inaccessible bait? This question describes an ancient test of animal intelligence (see Taylor, Medina et al., 2010) . Piaget used a version with a toy resting on a cloth to test children's physical understanding. This was adapted for monkeys and apes (Hauser, 1997; Povinelli, 2000) . In more elaborate versions, subjects choose the one of two or more crossed or slanted strings that is tied to a reward. These latter setups seem to test perceptual factors rather than physical understanding, as nicely stated by Köhler (1925, p. 29 ; italics in original) in reference to a chimpanzee choosing among strings leading to but not all attached to a bait. "He will always pull the string if it visibly touches the bait. It appears doubtful whether the conception of 'connexion' in our practical human sense signifies more for the chimpanzee than visual contact in a higher or lower degree." Povinelli (2000) reinforced this conclusion with more extensive tests. Even human adults, who presumably do understand connection, are influenced by perceptual contact in such tasks (Silva, Silva, Cover, Leslie, & Rubalcaba, 2008) , suggesting that physical causal understanding is not key to solving them. Some research with mammals has also used nonprimates such as dogs and even rats (see Taylor, Medina et al., 2010) . I focus here on an instructive series of studies with birds beginning with those of Thorpe's colleague Margaret Vince (chapter 14 in Thorpe, 1956; Vince, 1961) in which string pulling is seen as a test of insight. Here bait hangs from a long string tied to a perch. Once a bird reaches toward the bait and pulls up a section of string, the bird must hold the string with a foot while pulling up the next section, and so on until the bait is within reach. Success requires suppressing flying at the food and other direct approaches and sitting on the perch instead. The importance of coordination between beak and feet in this task predicts, correctly, that success will vary with species. In Vince's studies of small songbirds, species such as tits that use their feet in feeding succeeded quickly whereas greenfinches and canaries, which usually do not, had to be trained by feeding them on the perch and then presenting food on a very short string. Unsurprisingly, keas, a species of parrot, succeed readily (Werdenich & Huber, 2006) , as do ravens (Heinrich, 1995) . Parrots and corvids (the crow family, including ravens and jays) should also excel on the assumption that string pulling reveals intelligence because they have large relative brain sizes for birds (Emery, 2006; Taylor, Elliffe, Hunt, & Gray, 2010) . Even when the required motor patterns are a natural part of feeding, however, relevant experience with elements of the task can be important. For instance, Vince's birds needed experience using their feet to grasp pliable objects like worms or strings (Thorpe, 1956) , and wild ravens needed habituation to dangling strings or meat tied to string (Heinrich, 1995) .
Insightful solution of the string pulling task would consist of a sudden transition from direct approaches to standing on the perch and pulling up the string. In Vince's (1961) set-up the bait was suspended in a glass tube held by a clamp. A common direct approach was to perch on the clamp and peck at the bait through the glass. Some greenfinches and canaries never abandoned such unsuccessful behaviour, but of those that did, Vince's (1961) trial-by-trial analysis revealed no evidence of insight. Improvement was gradual, and success was not permanent. As Vince (1961, p. 125) concluded, "The case for insight is a poor one."
Although that conclusion may be correct for small songbirds, Heinrich (1995 Heinrich ( , 2000 reached a different conclusion from studies of ravens. Just as in Vince's studies, there was no evidence of sudden change from a direct approach (here, jumping and flying at the freely hanging meat) to standing on the perch and pulling the string. Of the ravens that were not too fearful to attempt the task, some never abandoned a direct approach whereas others sat on the perch, pulled up the string, and succeeded in obtaining the meat from the very first trial. Heinrich (1995) attributes such immediate success to insight, interpreted as understanding (i.e., "having in-sight into") the connection between the string and the meat (and/or between pulling and stepping on the string and obtaining meat) and immediately assembling the required behavioural elements into the pattern required to solve the novel task. Werdenich and Huber (2006) reached the same conclusion for keas, most of which also succeeded immediately.
To further test ravens' understanding of the causal relationship between pulling up the string and obtaining meat, Heinrich and Bugnyar (2005) used a clever arrangement in which pulling down on a string caused hanging meat to come closer. They proposed that if string pulling is solely a result of instrumental learning, this pull down task should be no harder than the standard task because coordinated pulling and stepping would still be reinforced by the sight of the meat coming closer. In contrast, if physical causal understanding ("insight") is involved, the counterintuitive relationship between pulling and movement of the bait should make the pull-down task harder. Consistent with the latter view, none of six naïve ravens solved the pull down task. In contrast, five ravens with experience in the pull-up task succeeded immediately. This is because, Heinrich and Bugnyar (2005) suggest, they transferred enhanced physical understanding from the pull-up task.
While not entirely ruling out a possible role for causal understanding, a new study by Taylor and colleagues (Taylor, Medina et al., 2010) clearly establishes the importance of instrumental reinforcement from seeing reward approach when the string is pulled up and held. They studied New Caledonian crows, a corvid species whose a tool-making and tool-using suggests exceptional intelligence. Visual feedback was restricted by suspending the bait from a platform with a 3-cm-diameter hole in it. Birds could reach the string through the hole but could not watch the movement of the meat as they pulled up and stepped on the string. In this setup all but one of four naïve crows failed completely to get the meat in 10 trials, and the one that succeeded took five trials to do so. When partial visual feedback was provided by placing a mirror so the approaching reward was visible while pulling, two of four crows succeeded in three to five trials. In contrast, four naïve crows all succeeded at standard string pulling in one or two trials. These birds transferred pulling the string to the visually restricted version of the apparatus, but they did not immediately or consistently obtain the meat. Taylor and colleagues (2010) conclude that success at string pulling reflects perceptual-motor learning, that is, associating visual feedback from pulling and stepping on the string with the approach of reward. Just as in other species, the coordination between pulling and stepping on the string improved with practice, also consistent with a role for learning. On this view, the superiority of the larger-brained corvids and parrots over small songbirds like Vince tested reflects not superior causal understanding but very rapid learning supported by larger association areas. Looking back at Heinrich and Bugnyar's (2005) pull-down task, Taylor et al. suggest the experienced birds succeeded where naïve birds failed because, since the meat is not in the birds' direct line of sight as they pull and step, the task requires dividing attention between pull-and-step actions and movement of the meat. Birds that had already perfected the coordination of pulling and stepping could better attend to the effects of their actions on the meat. Transfer of the rewarded action of pulling from the similar pull-up apparatus was likely also a factor in their success. Finally, an additional argument against physical understanding playing a role in string pulling is that neither corvids (Heinrich & Bugnyar, 2005; Taylor, Medina et al., 2010) nor keas (Werdenich & Huber, 2006) consistently choose the one baited string out of two or more crossed strings.
In summary, a half-century of studies with birds doing string pulling tasks provides no examples of insightful problem solving as understood either historically or in contemporary human literature, that is, sudden success after an impasse. Nor is there evidence for insight misdefined as a process involving understanding causal relationships (Heinrich, 2000) or mental trial and error (Bird & Emery, 2009c; Emery, in press; Emery & Clayton, 2004) . The task is much more difficult for some species than others, but this seems to be accounted for by a combination of species differences in associative learning and species-typical motor patterns. This does not mean research on string pulling has nothing to teach us about processes in animal problem solving, but we will have to look elsewhere for evidence of animal insight.
Aesop and the Clever Animals
In one of Aesop's fables a thirsty crow obtains water from a pitcher by filling it with stones to make the water level rise. There is no indication that this fictional crow showed insightful behaviour by suddenly abandoning unsuccessful approaches such as reaching into the pitcher and starting to collect stones, but some 21st century animals have behaved insightfully in an analogous task. Interestingly, though, others have not.
In the first modern instantiation of the "Aesop" test (Mendes, Hanus, & Call, 2007) , five captive orangutans were each presented with a peanut floating on a small amount of water in the bottom of a tube too narrow for an animal's hand. The animals initially tried to get the nut with their hands and mouths, but after 5-10 minutes in the very first trial all began collecting mouthfuls of water from a nearby drinker and spitting it into the tube until the peanut was within reach. In subsequent trials, they began spitting almost immediately, seldom trying direct approaches.
This study thus provides a clear and striking example of insightful behaviour. To test the generality of the finding, the same peanut task was given to further orangutans, gorillas, and two populations of chimpanzees (Hanus et al., 2011) . None of the 10 orangutans and five gorillas solved the task. Among the chimpanzees, none of 19 from one population succeeded, but five of another group of 24 eventually spat water into the tube and got the peanut. Other observations suggested that one factor responsible for so many of these additional animals failing the task was functional fixedness: encoding the familiar water dispenser as a source of water for quenching thirst blocked using it as source of a tool to get the peanut. This hypothesis was partially supported by an increase in spitting rate by some of the chimpanzees given a new water dispenser.
Hanus and colleagues (2011) also tested 4-to 8-year-old human children in the same task, with water provided in a pitcher. To be sure the children knew about pouring from the pitcher, they used it to water plants just before the test. And to manipulate the salience of water as something to float the peanut, half the children saw no water in the tube initially. Success rate within the one 8-min trial increased with both age and the presence of water in the tube. The youngest children seemed unable to direct their attention from the tube toward anything else in the room that might help them, whereas the older ones more readily abandoned direct approaches. The authors do not say, however, whether this happened in an all-or-nothing manner, nor whether any of the children's verbalizations were indicative of "aha" moments.
Clearly more could be done with the Aesop task as a possible test of insightful problem solving by children. In the meanwhile several researchers have put Aesop's original report directly to the test by studying corvids dropping stones down a tube to obtain a floating worm. In the first of these studies (Bird & Emery, 2009a) , rooks behaved just like Aesop's clever crow. However, because they had previously been rewarded for dropping stones down a similar tube, the fact that they succeeded right away has little to say about insight. Similarly, although a follow-up study with Eurasian jays and variations on water-filled tubes (Cheke, Bird, & Clayton, 2011) cleverly addressed the cognitive processes involved in the behaviour, it did not address whether it was initially insightful. Using a task in which a stone dropped down a tube causes food to fall out at the bottom, other studies (Bird & Emery, 2009b; von Bayern, Heathcote, Rutz, & Kacelnik, 2009 ) have addressed issues including the role of past experience in corvids' initial success and the birds' ability to choose appropriately sized and shaped objects for the job. As in the test for children, more could be done with these paradigms but so far they have little to tell us about insightful behaviour (see also Emery, in press).
Tool-Making: Birds Bend Wires
Dropping stones to get food is a form of tool use. Because tool use was traditionally assumed to be uniquely human, discussion of the cognitive underpinnings of animal tool use (e.g., Call, in press; Seed & Byrne, 2010) very often includes consideration of insight and comparisons of the overall intelligence and brain size of tool using with those of non-tool-using species. And if tool using is assumed to be a sign of intelligence, tool-making is even more so. Thus the report (Weir, Chappell, & Kacelnik, 2002 ) that a single New Caledonian crow, Betty, spontaneously made a wire tool to solve a novel problem in the laboratory attracted considerable attention. Betty was a New Caledonian crow, a species known to make and use tools in the wild (Hunt, 1996) . She was being tested to see whether she would select a wire hook rather than a straight wire to pull a little bucket of meat out of a well when another crow stole the hook. Betty, who had already successfully used hooked wire in this task, then tried poking the straight wire at the meat. After a series of failures with this direct approach, she withdrew the wire and began directing it at the base of the well, which was secured to its base with duct tape. The wire soon became stuck, whereupon Betty pulled it sideways, bending it and unsticking it. She then inserted the resulting hook into the well and extracted the meat. In all but one of 10 subsequent trials with only straight wire provided, she also made and used a hook in the same manner, but not before trying the straight wire first.
Although the original report of this behaviour (Weir et al., 2002) describes it simply as spontaneous solution suggestive of exceptional physical understanding, the fact that it involved a sudden transition from an unsuccessful direct approach to a new and successful one qualifies it as insightful. But it need not have involved understanding what was needed and seeing how to make it. Epstein's approach suggests simply that thrusting the straight wire directly at the meat was partially extinguished, allowing expression of the alternative direct approach of poking the wire at the bucket from outside the tube. This got it stuck in the duct tape, and pulling-perhaps in trying to extract it-then resulted in a hook, which Betty used because it resembled the hooks she had been reinforced for using in the past.
Alternative explanations for Betty's hook-making could be pitted against each other by comparing individuals with and without past experience using hooks in the bucket-and-well task. Perhaps because of the scarcity of New Caldonian crows in laboratories, no such study has been reported, but one with children has. One of the former crow researchers and her colleagues (Beck, Apperly, Chappell, Guthrie, & Cutting, 2011 ) gave children aged 3-11 years and adults the bucket and well problem, although this time the bucket had a sticker in it, not raw meat. A large majority of all subjects chose a hooked over a straight pipe cleaner to pull up the bucket. However, when different subjects were presented with a straight pipe cleaner along with distracters unsuitable as tools, only about 5% of 3-to 5-year-olds and 50% of 7-to 8-year-olds-compared with 100% of the adults-made a hook to pull out the bucket. In contrast, most children who had seen hook making demonstrated made a hook themselves. These findings probably don't mean Betty was smarter than half the 7-year-olds in this study. She did have experience using a hook. And in any case, human adults and older children presumably have it over the crows in understanding why hooks work. But this (Beck et al., 2011 ) is a great example of reverse comparative psychology, or turning Darwin on his head (Shettleworth, 2010b) , by taking a test devised for other animals and trying it with human subjects to look for common mechanisms. It does not, however, report whether any of the children's successes qualified as insightful.
Although no more New Caledonian crows have been challenged to make hooks in the bucket and well task, some captive rooks have (Bird & Emery, 2009b) . Because rooks are a species of corvid not known to use tools in the wild, this study also tests the assumption that tool users have specialized physical intelligence (see Emery & Clayton, 2009) . Before the test with wires, the rooks used wooden hooks to retrieve the bucket from the well. When then given a straight wire, they inserted it into the well and bent it. Unlike Betty, the rooks bent the wire by pulling sideways on it while one end was down in the well, then turning it around to direct the hooked end toward the bucket. Photographs of the setup (Emery, in press) suggest that the great height of the well relative to the rook favoured this behaviour, an explanation that could be tested by, for example, lowering the well relative to the surface of the cage. Bird and Emery (2009b; 2009c) claim that they have provided evidence of insightful behaviour, not because the rooks suddenly solved the problem after an impasse as appears to be the case for Betty but because these authors (incorrectly) define insight mechanistically as physical understanding and imagination. These authors also claim that their birds' previous experience with triangular wooden hooks did not contribute to making and using wire hooks, a claim that needs testing, especially in light of evidence (e.g., Hauser, 1997) that some species ignore changes in material and colour and choose novel tools based on functionality.
In conclusion, although studies with the bucket and well task have contributed to the comparative understanding of how animals solve novel problems, so far they have contributed only suggestive evidence of insightful behaviour. As with the "Aesop" task, much more could be done studying species such as rooks and children that are more readily available in laboratories than New Caledonian crows.
Insightful Rats?
If insightful behaviour is sudden success after an impasse, that is, after a period of unrelated unsuccessful behaviour as distinct from approximation through trial and error, then recent analyses of classical conditioning and instrumental discrimination learning (Durstewitz, Vittoz, Floresco, & Seamans, 2010; Gallistel, Fairhurst, & Balsam, 2004 ) not only provide examples of it but imply it is common. In the example most directly connected with insight, Durstewitz and colleagues (2010) trained rats on a set shifting task, instrumental discrimination learning in which the relevant cue suddenly switched from visual to spatial. The rats were first rewarded for pressing whichever one of two levers was indicated by a light and then, with no signal as to the new contingency, for pressing the lever in a fixed location (e.g., left) regardless of the light's location. At the same time, the researchers recorded activity in populations of neurons in the medial prefrontal cortex, an area implicated in set shifting in other species. When the relevant feature shifted, the rats' behaviour tended to change abruptly from following the formerly correct cue to following the currently correct one. Individual rats' neural activity changed in parallel with their behaviour. These authors explicitly suggest that these abrupt neural and behavioural transitions correspond to moments of sudden insight.
That such abrupt transitions from unrewarded to rewarded behaviour may be the rule rather than the exception is the theme of an analysis of learning curves by Gallistel and colleagues (2004) . Taking examples from rats, mice, and pigeons, they argue that the traditional gradual learning curve results from averaging over multiple subjects. Individual animals' learning curves exhibit an abrupt transition from an initial low level of the rewarded response to the subject's final level. This pattern supports the controversial (see Shettleworth, 2010a) conclusion that rather than reflecting a gradual increase in associative strength, as usually assumed (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) , classically and instrumentally conditioned behaviour is the outcome of an evidence-based decision process: when the subject has accumulated enough evidence it decides to start making the rewarded response and makes it at the asymptotic rate.
The data analysed by Gallistel et al. (2004) include some from studies similar to that of Durstewitz et al. (2010) , but do any of these data from traditional learning paradigms qualify as examples of insightful behaviour? In classical conditioning, from which most of their examples come, the animal is passively exposed to a stimulus-outcome contingency, for example, light followed by food. There is no problem to be solved because the outcome arrives regardless of the animal's behaviour. Instrumental conditioning is another story. Here the outcome depends on what the animal does, just as in problem-solving tasks in which insightful behaviour may occur. But does a sudden increase in response rate in an ordinary instrumental learning task really qualify as insightful? In the problem-solving tasks traditionally claimed to foster insightful behaviour, the rewarded behaviour seems to appear out of nowhere. It has never actually occurred in the situation before, although it could reflect generalisation of past learning and/or species-typical behaviour. In contrast, in the examples analysed by Gallistel et al. and by Durstewitz and colleagues, the rewarded response is initially performed at a low rate, more or less by chance. Otherwise, it could never be rewarded and thereby increase in rate. For instance, in set switching when the cue switches from visual to spatial, a rat that has learned to follow the nowirrelevant light is being rewarded for the 50% of its choices to the correct side (i.e., when the light is on that side). What Gallistel et al. claim to be sudden is the transition from this low initial rate to the high terminal rate characteristic of well-trained animals whereas the question in studies of insight is how the correct response appears in the first place.
Nevertheless, Gallistel et al.'s (2004) proposal has some strengths as a potential theoretical account of how experience generates insightful behaviour. For instance, it explains the frequent observation that, once it has occurred, the insightful response occurs with short latency on subsequent encounters with the problem. It also suggests that by training rats and monkeys in common laboratory tasks, neurobiological studies of insightful behaviours in animals can be linked with brain imaging studies of human insight (Bowden et al., 2005; Kounios & Beeman, 2009) , as in the study of Durstewitz et al. (2010) . But the similarity between the situations in which Gallistel et al. (2004) find abrupt behavioural transitions and those traditionally used in studies of insightful behaviour may not be as close as it first appears.
Summary and Conclusions
Recent comparative research on insightful behaviour has not been well integrated with contemporary research on human insight, largely as a result of confusions about definition. Köhler's (1925 Köhler's ( /1959 classic observations on chimpanzees defined insightful behaviour as sudden success after an impasse. Contemporary studies of human insight address the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying problem-solving behaviour that fits this definition. The theoretically contentious question is whether insightful behaviour is the product of a special mechanism or process, namely insight, as opposed to processes used in routine problem-solving. In the case of animals, this usually means associative learning. Complicating matters for testing nonverbal creatures, the acid test of insightful problem solution in people is its distinctive phenomenology, the "aha" experience. Contemporary comparative researchers (see also discussion in Call, in press) tend to conflate all three levels of analysisproduct, process, and phenomenology-by suggesting that because we cannot ask animals about their "aha" experiences we should define insightful behaviour in terms of processes such as mental trial and error (the exact opposite of insight) or causal understanding (which need not be implicated in insightful solutions by people, e.g., with verbal or perceptual problems).
Some have suggested (see Topolinski & Reber, 2010) that the "aha" experience is an emotional reaction to the sudden increase in fluency common to problems with mechanistically different underpinnings. Surprise and delight at finding a solution is not in itself indicative of a single special problem-solving process. Considering the range of problems studied under the banner of insight, this seems likely. In any case, the perhaps insurmountable difficulties in getting animals to say "aha" need not stand in the way of a productive comparative study of insight. In the past couple of decades comparative researchers have forged methods for tackling cognitive processes that have distinctive phenomenology in humans. Episodic memory (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998) and metacognition (Hampton, 2009 ) are the leading examples. Functional similarity of input-output relations, that is, of the product of a hypothesised common process, guides mechanistic investigations at both behavioural and neural levels. As we have seen, there are already numerous demonstrations that a wide range of species may suddenly succeed at a difficult problem after an impasse rather than gradually improving via trial and error. As with human subjects, past experience with the elements of a problem can influence the latency or probability of success. There is plenty of room for more investigation of how this influence works. Recent research with rats and mice suggests that the study of animal insight may not require exotic species or problems that seem intellectually challenging. Work with these species can connect quite directly with current work on the neuroscience of human insight. If the parallels between this work and more traditional studies of animal insight hold up, they open the way for new comparative research on insight at both behavioural and neural levels.
Résumé
Il n'est pas possible de vérifier chez les animaux la phénoménolo-gie particulière de l'intuition, aussi appelée l'expérience Ah ah, mais il est possible d'étudier les phénomènes sous-jacents au comportement intuitif, que Köhler a décrit comme étant la solution soudaine à un problème après une impasse. La question centrale dans l'étude du comportement intuitif chez toute espèce consiste à déterminer si celui-ci est le résultat d'un processus cognitif distinct, l'intuition. Si certains parmi ceux qui appuient la notion d'intuition chez les animaux la confondent avec d'autres processus de résolution de problèmes, la recherche contemporaine sur le test des ficelles et d'autres problèmes à résoudre, principalement chez les oiseaux, a révélé de nouveaux exemples de comportement intuitif et a permis d'éclaircir le rôle de l'expérience pour sa réalisation. Des recherches récentes suggèrent que le comportement intuitif peut être reproduit dans le cadre de tâches en laboratoire durant lesquelles l'activité cérébrale est surveillée. Voilà qui ouvre la voie à une meilleure intégration de la recherche avec des animaux à la neuroscience cognitive de l'intuition humaine.
Mots-clés : intuition, cognition comparée, résolution de problèmes, animaux, apprentissage.
